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1. Introduction
In the last decade, mobile telephony has been the fastest growing segment in the tele-
communications industry. In June 2003, after a few years of exponential growth, there
were more than 60 million subscribers to mobile telephony providers in Germany.
Between January 1998 and June 2003 the total number of subscribers grew by about
700%. During the same period of time, the index of prices for mobile services calculated
by the German Statistical Office fell by about 41%. Whether such a moderate price
decrease can fuel the exponential change in the market size is a question that is yet to
be answered.
At first glance, it is unlikely that prices alone can account for such a large increase in the
user base. The introduction of prepaid cards and new services, such as the short message
service (SMS) and wireless application protocol (WAP), together with the increasing
attractiveness of handsets has played a very important role in the development of the
industry. However, network effects may be another force that can rationalize such tremen-
dous growth rates. A product that exhibits network effects becomes more valuable when
more people use it. In our opinion, network effects influence the decision of consumers
to subscribe to mobile services.
Network effects in mobile telephony may have different origins. In the first place, an
increase in the number of mobile users increases communication options. In particular,
the consumption of mobile services can be attributed to a single person and not to a house-
hold. This implies a much larger potential market size than in the case of fixed telephony.
Second, in addition to voice telephony, mobile firms can offer several other services, such
as SMS, MMS, WAP and email, which may themselves be subject to network effects.
Finally, the spread of mobile services within an individual’s social circle may exert social
pressure inducing him or her to subscribe. For example, lack of mobile contact may lead
to exclusion from spontaneous social events.
In this paper, we investigate whether network effects have an impact on the decision of
consumers to subscribe to mobile telephony services in Germany. Our analysis is based on
publicly available industry data, namely subscription levels, prices and churn rates for the
period from January 1998 to June 2003 in monthly intervals. One of our main goals is to
present a simple methodology which uses such limited information and can yet enhance
our understanding of the evolution of the mobile industry.
The most easily accessible industry statistics in Germany, as in many other countries
worldwide, are the subscription levels. Although interesting for describing the state of
the industry, by itself this information is hardly useful in studying how consumer demand
responds to changes in industry determinants. An important shortcoming is due to the fact
that consumers often sign long term deals with their service providers, and hence do not
engage in decision making every month. However, a simple first difference of subscription
levels does not correspond to sales because a significant amount of consumers with expir-
ing contracts leave their previous operator.
In this paper, we propose using churn rates to impute the fraction of switching consum-
ers and approximate the number of locked in consumers – those who do not make sub-
scription decisions. First difference of observed subscription levels and the number of
locked in consumers should yield a good approximation for the number of new contracts
sold. The second set of important variables we need are firm-specific prices. However,
these are hard to find in a prepared form since the German Statistical Office provides only
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vide detailed information on the tariffs offered by each provider. These can be used to con-
struct operator-specific price indexes.
We use installed bases, sales and prices along with several other control variables, to
estimate a system of demand equations. A clear drawback of working with limited data
is naturally the constraints it imposes upon the sophistication of the estimated model.
We therefore use fairly standard methods and functional forms that have been success-
fully used in earlier literature on network effects. We explicitly state the economic and
statistical assumptions, which are necessary for interpreting results of our simple esti-
mation methodology as indicative of the strength of network effects in mobile
telephony.
We use a standard aggregate nested logit model following Berry (1994). We assume that
consumers first decide whether to subscribe to fixed telephony services only or to both
mobile and fixed services. By normalizing with respect to the utility of fixed telephony ser-
vices, one can impute the mean utility levels of subscribing to mobile telephony services via
a simple transformation of observed market shares. We then posit a relatively straightfor-
ward linear utility for subscribing to mobile services and search for parameters that allow
our linear model to best explain observed mean utility levels.
In modeling network effects, we use the lagged total share of subscribers in the popu-
lation to proxy for network size. This assumes perfect compatibility between provider ser-
vices and the lack of price-mediated network effects due to different on-net and off-net
prices. We test the appropriateness of this specification in two ways. In the first extension,
we allow own network size to have a different effect to the size of the other operators’ net-
work. We cannot reject the hypothesis that the network effects are not firm specific, which
supports our formulation. The second extension tests whether the linear specification we
use is appropriate. We re-estimated the model using a Box–Cox transformation of net-
work size. We cannot reject the hypothesis that the network sizes affect utility in a linear
fashion.
Our results suggest that network effects played a significant role in the diffusion of
mobile services in Germany. In the absence of network effects, if prices remained as
observed, the penetration of mobiles could be lower by at least 50%. Current penetration
levels could be reached without network effects only if prices were drastically lower. More-
over, assuming that observed prices result from pure strategy Nash equilibrium, we com-
pute marginal costs and total margins.1 The price-cost margin for all network operators
increased over time from about 13% in January 1998 to about 30% in June 2003. This
increase is due to the fact that margins remained almost constant while the prices
decreased.
The next section provides a short overview of empirical literature on network effects
and the telecommunications industry. In Section 2, we present a brief history and current
state of the mobile industry in Germany. The model we use for econometric analysis is pre-
sented in Section 3. Data description and estimation results follow in Sections 4 and 5,
respectively. Finally, we conclude our analysis in Section 6.1 Clearly, the assumption of a static Nash equilibrium is highly likely to be incorrect given the dynamic
evolution of demand. Nevertheless, this exercise provides a crude first-order approximation to total margins and
their evolution and is therefore informative.
2. Literature
There is a growing body of literature that attempts to measure indirect and direct
network effects in a variety of network industries. For instance, Gandal et al. (2000)
study the diffusion of CD technology and find that the number of CD titles available
has an impact on the consumer’s willingness to adopt the CD player. Park (2003) ana-
lyzes the role of network effects in the standard war between VHS and Betamax video
recording systems. Similarly, Ohashi (2003) estimates a random utility model and mea-
sures the role of network externalities in the diffusion of VCRs in the US between 1978
and 1986. Clements and Ohashi (2005) estimate indirect network effects in the US video
game market between 1994 and 2002 using a nested logit model. Goolsbee and Klenow
(2002) estimate a reduced form diffusion model for home computers and find that peo-
ple are more likely to adopt computer technology in areas with a higher fraction of
computer users.
There are a number of earlier papers that focus on estimating a hedonic price function
for products showing network effects. Brynjolfsson and Kemerer (1996) use the hedonic
pricing model to determine the impact of network effects, defined as compatibility with
the dominant standard, on the prices of microcomputer spreadsheets. Similar approaches
are employed by Hartman and Teece (1990), Gandal (1994), Economides and Himmelberg
(1995), Moch (1995) and Gro¨hn (1999). For an excellent review of the theoretical and
empirical literature on network effects and switching costs, we refer the reader to Farrell
and Klemperer (2006).
The empirical studies that account for network effects in the telecommunications indus-
try are relatively scarce. Most studies focus on the diffusion of telecommunications services
and use reduced form regression and diffusion models. The presence of network effects has
not usually been taken into account. For instance, Gruber and Verboven (2001) estimate a
logistic diffusion model for the EU countries and find that regulation and technological
progress are important for the growth of the mobile industry. Wallsten (2003) uses data
on the telecommunications industry worldwide to analyze whether the sequence of
reforms, such as establishing a regulatory authority and privatization of the incumbent,
is of importance. Koski and Kretschmer (2005) analyze the effects of regulation and com-
petition on the development of mobile telephony.
There are a few recent studies which explicitly acknowledge network effects in the tele-
communications industry. Bousquet and Ivaldi (1997) estimate network effects in fixed-line
telephony in terms of usage. Kim and Kwon (2003) use a consumer survey to analyze Kor-
ean mobile telephony and conclude that consumers prefer carriers that have larger con-
sumer bases. Birke and Swann (2006) use household survey data to identify price-
mediated network effects in mobile telephony in the UK.
The paper most similar to ours is Grajek (2003) which estimates the magnitude of net-
work effects in the Polish mobile telephone industry during the period 1996–2001. He
essentially adopts the model of Katz and Shapiro (1985) and assumes that mobile services
are homogeneous and firms set equal hedonic prices. He adopts a quadratic network ben-
efit function and allows the own and competitors’ subscriber base to have a different effects
on utility. He develops an estimating equation which explains the total subscriber base in
each period. By estimating a system of such equations, he finds significant network effects
which are mainly due to the own installed base, despite full technological compatibility
between the networks of different firms. Our model differs from Grajek (2003) in a number
of aspects. We model the services of different providers as differentiated products. More
importantly, we posit a model of sales each period.
3. Mobile telephony in Germany
3.1. Development of the industry
The second-generation (2G) digital networks (GSM 900) started providing services in
1992.2 Two licenses were granted – the first to the state-owned Deutsche TelekomMobilnet
which was later privatized and transformed into T-Mobile. The second license went to the
first private mobile network operator Mannesmann Mobilfunk, which was later taken over
by Vodafone. In 1993, a third license was granted to E-plus. This network began to operate
on 1800 MHz one year later. Another license was granted in 1997 to Viag Interkom (later
called O2) which started providing services in November 1998. In 1999, T-Mobile and
Mannesmann-Vodafone were granted transmission rights on 1800 MHz as well.
In 2000, the German government auctioned licenses for third-generation mobile net-
works (UMTS) that allow data to be transferred at much higher rates in order to satisfy
the demands of multimedia applications. A total of DM 99 billion was paid by six com-
panies for the rights to develop 3G networks: Group 3G (Quam), T-Mobil, Mannes-
mann-Vodafone, Auditorium, Mobilcom Multimedia and O2. These companies were
established by consortiums of large multinational telecommunications companies and
existing GSM network operators. Network development and the introduction of the 3G
communications standard on the German market was expected to take place in 2002–
2005. One of the license winners, Quam, entered the market in November 2001 by signing
roaming agreements with other network operators. It acquired about 200,000 consumers
but subsequently went bankrupt one year later.3
3.2. Market structure
Network operators may sell services to consumers directly or indirectly through inde-
pendent service providers (ISPs). In general, an ISP resells airtime on a third party’s
mobile network by providing billing and customer care services under its own brand name.
In Germany, network operators can commercially decide whether to sign an ISP agree-
ment. According to the German Telecommunications Act the agreements between net-
work operators and ISPs have to be non-discriminatory and assure fair competition
between retailers. Typically, the tariffs offered by ISPs reflect tariffs of the network carriers.
In 2003, there were four network operators – T-Mobile, D2 Vodafone, E-Plus and O2 –
and about twelve ISPs in Germany. Only O2 has not reached an agreement with ISPs. Out
of these firms, only eight had significant market shares – network operators: T-Mobil
(29.9%), D2 Vodafone (27.7%), E-Plus (9.3%), O2 (6.3%) and ISPs: Debitel (12.7%),
Mobilcom (6.5%), Talkline (3.2%), Drillisch (2.4%). The remaining ISPs accounted for
only about 2.0% of subscribers.4 The market share of ISPs has decreased over time.2 2G networks were preceded by the analog network provided by the state-owned monopolist Deutsche
Bundespost-Telekom which was switched off in year 2000.
3 Source: ‘‘Connect’’ magazine, http://www.xonio.de.
4 Source: www.RegTP.de.
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sumers can only choose among network operators. Subscribers to ISPs are included into
the consumer bases of the respective network operators.
Since the introduction of 2G networks, the mobile industry has experienced dra-
matic growth rates. At the end of 2003, the number of mobile subscribers reached
64.8 million, which implies a penetration rate of 78.3%. The distribution of market
shares between the four network operators has remained stable in the last few years,
with T-Mobile maintaining about 40.6%, D2 Vodafone – 38.1%, E-Plus – 12.7% and
O2 – 8.6% as of the third quarter 2003. Clearly, as the high market shares of T-Mobile
and Vodafone suggest, early entry played a critical role for the size and growth of the
consumer base. Late entrants E-plus and O2 applied innovative pricing policies but did
not manage to enlarge their market shares substantially. For instance, since July 1999,
O2 has been offering the Genion tariff. Under this tariff users pay fixed-line rates for
calls within at least one hundred meters around their declared home location and a
lower city tariff within the city area. Since December 1998, E-Plus has been providing
a range of time and more tariffs with free minutes and prices independent of call
destination.
4. Empirical model
We model demand for mobile subscriptions using a discrete-choice model, as discussed
in Anderson et al. (1992) and Berry (1994). We use the estimation strategy proposed by
Berry (1994) and invert market-share equations to find the implied mean levels of utility
for each alternative. We then posit a functional form for this utility in terms of observed
and unobserved variables. The unobserved variable serves as our econometric error term
and is interpreted as the mean value of consumer valuation of unobserved product char-
acteristics, such as product quality. Some components of the unobserved characteristics
can be captured by dummy variables.
We assume that all consumers have access to a fixed line. In the first stage they
decide whether to continue using a fixed telephone alone or to buy a mobile as well.
In the second stage, consumers choose a network operator. This is a standard nested
logit structure, where one branch is degenerated and no further choices are made.
The utility of an outside option for consumer i at time t is denoted by Ui0t and may
vary in time due to its dependence on the prices of fixed-line services. The utility derived
by consumer i from using a fixed-line together with mobile services of network operator
j can be written asUijt ¼ Ui0t þ rj  apjt þ V ðzet Þ þ njt þ fgt þ ð1 rÞijt; ð1Þ
where rj is the stand alone value, pjt represents service price and V ðzet Þ is the expected net-
work benefit, which we discuss in detail in the next subsection. The variable fgt is a com-
mon value for all products in group g = {0,1} and has a distribution dependent on r,
with 0 6 r < 1. The nest g = 0 stands for fixed-line alone and g = 1 represents the choice
of mobile telephony plus fixed line. By normalizing with respect to the utility of the out-
side option, the choice of alternatives becomes independent of the determinants of the
fixed line utility. The consumer’s tastes for products within the nest may be correlated.
When the choice of alternatives in the nest is independent, which implies that r = 0,
nested logit is reduced to a simple logit. Finally, njt accounts for the population average
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has a double exponential distribution.5
As with Berry (1994), we invert observed market shares to compute mean utility levels
for each product and treat them as observed. Using the observed utility level and our spec-










7 ThlogðsjtÞ  logð1 stÞ ¼ rj  apjt þ V ðzet Þ þ r logðsjtjg¼1Þ þ njt; ð2Þ
where sjt represents the share of operator j in the total number of consumers that make
decisions about subscription and st ¼
P
jsjt. The share of operator j in the total sales of
mobile services is denoted by sjtjg. The unobserved utility, njt, serves as the econometric
error term.
The specification of utility function (1) is representative of consumers with sufficiently
low (zero) switching costs and of new consumers. Otherwise, the utility function may
depend on the previous choice due to switching costs, for instance. Because we lack precise
data on the number of switching consumers and their choices of network operators, we
have to make simplifying assumptions. We assume that there are three types of consumers.
Consumers with sufficiently low switching costs and new consumers choose network oper-
ators, while consumers with high switching costs are locked-in and continue using the
same mobile services. Hence, locked-in consumers are assumed to be out of the market
and are excluded from computed market shares. We approximate the number of
locked-in consumers using data on accumulated subscriptions and churn rates.6 This
approximation implicitly assumes that all consumers with zero switching costs change net-
work operators. Consequently, we assume that the share of consumers with zero switching
costs is determined by the firm-specific churn rate kjt. One can thus approximate the sales
of an operator j in period t by the difference between the observed number of subscribers
and the number of locked in consumers: yjt = Zjt  (1  kjt)Zjt1 where Zjt stands for the
number of subscribers. In this case the number of locked-in consumers is large. On the
other hand, if we calculate market shares assuming that all consumers can react to price
changes each month, that is when kjt = 1, we get higher estimates of price elasticities
and network effects. These estimates are sensitive with respect to the value of kjt because
when it increases, the share of consumers choosing mobiles increases relative to the share
of outside option.
The total number of consumers who can make subscription decisions is given by
mt ¼ Mt 
P
jð1 kjtÞZjt1, and represents our market size. The termMt is the population
in period t. Only consumers aged over 16, that is 84% of total population, are considered.7
Thus, the share of subscribers of network operator j in the total number of consumers thate only firm characteristics in the model are prices, stand alone values and unobserved qualities. The other
ial choice determinants, such as coverage and reception quality, were constant throughout the time of this
An exception is O2, which had smaller network coverage immediately after entry in November 1998 but is
ed from this analysis for the reasons discussed in the next section. According to tests carried out by the
munications magazine ‘‘Connect’’ from 30.11.2000, the networks are hardly distinguishable as regards
ge and reception quality.
r any given period of time, the churn rate equals the number of subscribers who discontinue their use of
services divided by the total number of users. We are very grateful to Jan Kranke for providing us with
n approximate quarterly churn rates for network operators in Germany. We calculate monthly data by
approximation.
e estimation results are robust with respect to small variation in market definition.
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4.1. Network effects in mobile telephony
So far we have not specified how consumers form expectations about network size and
how the network benefit function is formulated. Most of the empirical and theoretical lit-
erature on network effects assumes linear network benefits. Swann (2002) examines the
assumptions on communications needs which are necessary for the utility function to be
either linear or s-shaped in network size. He argues that an s-shaped utility function in net-
work size is more realistic for an average consumer and that this shape may differ for pio-
neers, medium adopters and late adopters. In the time period considered in this study, the
mobile telephony market in Germany was in its fastest growth phase. Thus, the network
benefits should be well approximated by a simple linear function V ðzet Þ ¼ bzet . We provide
a test which supports the linear specification compared to a more general model where the
network benefit function is assumed to have a Box–Cox form.
We employ a very simple rule for the formation of expectations. We assume that con-
sumers think that the network penetration in the previous period will continue in the cur-
rent period. When the market reaches a steady state, such formation of expectations will
be fulfilled. Networks are fully compatible and their users may freely communicate with
each other. Thus, expected penetration is represented by the sum of lagged installed bases
divided by the size of population, zet ¼
P
jZjt1=Mt1  zt1. A new subscriber to any of the
networks brings the same marginal utility.
Clearly consumers derive network benefits from a fixed-line network as well. In the last
decade, however, changes in the number of subscribers to fixed-line telephony were negli-
gible. Given our assumption regarding the linear network benefit function and the linear
form of utility function in (1), any network benefits from the fixed lines are cancelled when
we normalize with respect to the outside option. Furthermore, there may also be asymmet-
ric own and cross-network effects due to differences in on-net and off-net prices. We tested
for this possibility, and found that our data does not support network effects with different
magnitudes.
5. The data
The data on mobile subscriptions was collected from the Internet site run by the Ger-
man regulator – RegTP. Subscription data is available from June 1992, but we have
restricted this analysis to the period for which we were able to collect prices. As a result,
we have 66 monthly observations from January 1998 to June 2003. Because of the late
entry of the fourth network operator O2 in November 1998 and its small market share
at the end of the period analyzed (8.6%), it may be difficult to estimate demand for this8 Some assumptions about the number of people taking decisions is unavoidable. Even if information about the
number of expiring contracts were available, there is no way to obtain information on the number of consumers
with zero switching costs. In order to compute sales, and hence market shares, we adopt the algorithm based on
the churn rates. We believe that it is easier to argue that the number of locked in users of mobile services is
relatively high.
operator. In this study we have only estimated demands for three main network operators,
which cover about 91% of the market: T-Mobile, D2 and E-Plus.
For the purpose of this study we need firm-specific prices. We collected tariff informa-
tion from the price listings published in telecommunication magazines and on the Internet
in the time period January 1998–June 2003.9 We applied the methodology used by the sta-
tistical office to compute firm-specific indices.10 First we assume infrequent usage behavior
and calculate expected monthly bills for all tariffs provided by network operators. In addi-
tion to what the statistical office does, we assume some randomness in calling behavior.
Hence we randomize the number and length of phone calls as well as the distribution of
calls among destination networks and time zones. The distribution among destination net-
works is proportional to the market shares. Moreover we account for price discrimination
between on-net and off-net calls, which is omitted in the computation of official indices.
We simulate 200 bills for each tariff and compute the mean values to compare tariffs.
Out of the set of tariffs offered by each network operator, we pick the tariff which delivers
the lowest bill. The cheapest tariff for the infrequent user is the one which determines the
subscription decision of the marginal consumer.
The price indices computed in this way are correlated with the official price indices pro-
vided by the statistical office. Fig. 1a presents changes in the minimum tariffs for an infre-
quent user during the time period of this study. Apart from prices, firms also compete
in handset subsidies and often provide handsets for free. For instance, in June 2003,
T-Mobile offered six different handsets for the price of 1 Euro, D2 – 10 handsets, E-Plus
– eight handsets and O2 – seven handsets.11 Network operators try to recoup the initial
investment in consumers through a stream of future payments.
5.1. Instrumental variables
To account for the endogeneity of prices and the within group shares we use instrumen-
tal variables. We have to find instruments which are correlated with prices and within
group shares, but uncorrelated with the unobservable demand shocks. The error terms
may be autocorrelated due to the character of data. Thus the usage of lagged endogenous
variables, such as lagged consumer base, could be problematic.
Standard candidates for instruments are proxies for cost factors. For instance, Evans
and Heckman (1984) estimate the total cost function in fixed-line telephony using prices
of materials, the price of capital and the wage rate. In this study we use only one cost fac-
tor as an instrument: the cost of telecommunications equipment. It is publicly available
through the German statistical office. The correlation coefficient of prices for mobile9 Source: magazine ‘‘Connect’’, http://www.teltarif.de.
10 The German statistical office computes four monthly price indices for mobile services. First, three consumer
profiles are defined based on the consumption intensities: infrequent, average and frequent users. Typically,
network operators provide a set of tariffs for each profile. For all tariffs within each profile, an expected monthly
bill is calculated. Consumers are assumed to be perfectly informed about the range of tariffs available each month
on the market and choose the cheapest one. In this way, three profile indices are created which are further used to
calculate aggregate weighted price index for mobile services. Tariffs consist of many price factors, such as on-net,
off-net, fixed-line, time zones, billing intervals and so on, but the statistical office uses only the most important
ones in the calculation. See Statistisches Bundesamt Wiesbaden (1999).
11 Source: ‘‘Connect’’ magazine, June 2003.






































































Fig. 1. (a) Lowest monthly bill for an infrequent user. (b) Industry growth with and without network effects. (c)
Price levels required to reach subscriptions with network effects. (d) Margins (q  c)/p.
ARTICLE IN PRESSservices with the hourly wages index in the telecommunications industry is almost zero and
there are no other cost variables publicly available.
We also use a dummy for Christmas sales as an instrument, which is an explanatory
variable in the model. Firms tend to offer special Christmas deals resulting in peak mobile
sales in November and December. Apart from that, at the start of the year, due to the
preparation for the international telecommunications fair – CeBIT, firms used to make
announcements of new tariffs. This fair is held in Hannover in early March. Thus we also
use a dummy for the first quarter as an instrument.
The time trend, which accounts for the technological innovation in mobile tele-
phony, may be a component of the cost function as well. It could be interpreted as
a constant upgrade in the quality of services and handsets. Furthermore the entry of
Viag, which took place in November 1998, could have decreased market prices and
shuffled market shares. We also use the numbers of tariffs offered by network operators
as instruments. Potentially, the variation in the number of tariffs should affect within
group shares.
Unfortunately we miss any other firm-specific variables. We use the following set of
instruments Wt = [1,christmast,quart1t,capitalt, timet,viagt, tariffsjt]. Our identifying
assumption is the mean independence of the demand shocks in (2) with the set of instru-
ments, i.e. E(njtjWt) = 0.
6. Estimation results
The demand for mobile subscriptions is dependent on service prices, the lagged total
installed base and a dummy for Christmas sales. The coefficients for price and network
benefits are assumed to be the same for all three networks. However, the Wald test rejects
the equality of demand intercepts (see Table 1).
First, demands are estimated using ordinary least squares (OLS) and two stage least
squares (2SLS) with the set of instruments discussed in the previous section. The estima-
tion results are presented in Table 1. According to the Hausman specification test, the null
hypothesis of the exogeneity of prices may be rejected at a significance level of 10%. The
Breusch–Godfrey test indicates autocorrelation of the error terms in all three demand
equations. We account for the problem of endogeneity and autocorrelation by estimating
the parameters using general method of moments (GMM) with the Newey–West estimator
for the covariance matrix of the moment conditions.
We also estimated two different versions of the model to check the robustness of our
results. The first extension considers differential magnitudes of own and cross-network
effects. Estimating demand functions that include both own and cross-installed bases
as explanatory variables turns out to be impossible due to the high correlation of sub-
scriptions. Hence we fix the estimate of the own network effects to the value from our
preferred specification (column III in Table 1) and test whether the cross-network effects
are significantly different. In this case the estimate of cross-network effects is given by
b0 = 1.72 (column IV in Table 1). The Wald test statistic of 4.44 implies that we cannot
reject the equality of own and cross-network effects at a significance level of 1%.12
Therefore, network effects resulting from the total installed base seem to be a justified
assumption.
Our second extension considers a possible nonlinearity of the network benefit function.
Similar to Clements and Ohashi (2005), we use a Box–Cox transformation of the lagged
penetration of mobiles and specify the modified network benefit function as
V ðzet Þ ¼ b ð1þzt1Þ
k1
k . This transformation allows for our linear specification when k = 1
and logarithmic when k = 0. Once again, due to a collinearity problem, we are not able
to estimate b and k simultaneously. Again we fix the coefficient of network effects b and
estimate k. The hypothesis that k = 1 cannot be rejected, which supports the use of a linear
network benefit function (Wald test statistics of 0.42). Also Clements and Ohashi (2005)
cannot reject the hypothesis of a linear specification for indirect network effects.
The estimates of all parameters are significant, as presented in Table 1. In particular, r
is estimated to be 0.80, which implies a relatively high correlation of choices within the
nest. We calculate the elasticities of demand to interpret the estimates of coefficients for
price and network effects. The own and cross-price elasticities of demand in the nested
logit model are specified as12 No
accounEsjtpkt ¼
 a
1r pjt 1 rsjtjg¼1  ð1 rÞsjt
 
if k ¼ j;
a
1r pkt rsktjg¼1 þ ð1 rÞskt
 
if k 6¼ j;
(te that when we computed firm-specific price indices, we took the difference in on-net and off-net prices into
t. Thus, any price-mediated network externality is already captured in the price indices.
Table 1













rd1 2.62 (8.77) 2.83 (8.40) 2.92 (21.68) 3.03 (37.77) 2.84 (27.13)
rd2 2.69 (9.24) 2.89 (8.81) 2.98 (22.46) 3.08 (40.14) 2.90 (28.14)
re1 2.96 (8.68) 3.21 (7.43) 3.28 (30.34) 3.32 (40.71) 3.24 (38.30)
b 1.34 (6.09) 1.40 (5.17) 1.47 (10.23) 1.47 1.47
b0 1.72 (14.49)
a 2.46 (8.40) 2.27 (6.44) 2.16 (15.14) 1.98 (21.55) 2.28 (17.44)
Christmas 0.31 (4.78) 0.31 (4.85) 0.33 (4.84) 0.36 (4.89) 0.33 (4.88)
r 0.85 (6.57) 0.79 (3.49) 0.80 (23.34) 0.89 (29.49) 0.76 (20.78)
k 0.82 (3.03)
MSE T-Mob 0.1073 0.1090 0.1098 0.1105 0.1081
MSE D2 0.1193 0.1196 0.1199 0.1200 0.1190
MSE E-Plus 0.1002 0.1000 0.1000 0.1004 0.0995
N * Obj. 20.80 6.1479 12.2979 11.9607 12.3651
Hausman 12.55
Pr > v2 0.0840
Wald 171.29 4.44 0.42
Pr > v2 0.001 0.035 0.51
ARTICLE IN PRESSwhere sjt is the share of network operator j in sales at time t and sjtjg¼1 is the within group
share. Table 2 presents the average elasticities for GMM estimates for period January
1998–June 2003.
For instance, a 1% price increase by T-Mobile resulted in 4.48% decrease in its sales and
in 2.22% increase in the sales by D2 and E-Plus. We also calculate the elasticity of demand





NetwoEstpkt ¼ asjtð1 stÞ
pkt
st
:The values in the last column in Table 2 are interpreted as follows: on average in the period
January 1998–June 2003, a 1% price increase by T-Mobile resulted in 0.52% decrease in total
sales of mobiles. This is the outcome of two opposite effects – a decrease in sales by T-Mobile
and an increase in sales by the other network operators. Similarly, a 1% price increase by D2
and E-Plus led to a decrease in total sales by 0.52% and 0.19%, respectively. The elasticity of
demand for mobile services in respect to the past installed base is specified asEstzt1 ¼ bzt1ð1 stÞ:2
d elasticities – prices and past consumer base
T-Mobile D2 E-Plus Mobiles st
ile 4.48 2.22 2.22 0.52
2.19 4.20 2.19 0.52
0.79 0.79 5.04 0.19
rk effect 0.69
ARTICLE IN PRESSIf the previous period total installed base increased by 1%, current period sales would
surge on average by 0.69%. This indicates strong network effects. If there were no network
effects, the industry growth would be stimulated only by price changes. As presented in
Fig. 1b, the penetration level in the absence of network effects could be at least 50% lower,
compared to the current case. This is due to the fact that prices remained almost constant
in the second part of the period analyzed. Network effects also have an impact on the equi-
librium prices, which is ignored in projections. In the absence of network effects, the cur-
rent penetration level could be reached only if prices were significantly lower. Fig. 1c
suggests that prices would have to fall to zero or even lower. These projections indicate
the importance of network effects for the growth of the industry. There was also a signif-
icant Christmas effect which resulted in an increase in demand for mobile subscriptions
during the months of November and December.
Furthermore, assuming that observed prices are the result of a pure strategy Nash equi-
librium, we can make use of the first-order equations to retrieve information about mar-
ginal costs. This assumption ignores the effects of current prices on future profits, which
potentially leads to overestimated margins. The estimates of margins may be interpreted
as an upper bound. Following Berry (1994), using first-order conditions for the nested




½1 rsjtjg¼1  ð1 rÞsjt
 
: ð3ÞUsing the estimates of a and r from the demand side we may calculate the changes in mar-
ginal cost and margin for each network operator over the time period analyzed. Fig. 1d
shows changes in the total margins calculated as (pjt  cjt)/pjt. The price-cost margin for
all network operators increased over time from about 13% in January 1998 to about
30% in June 2003. This increase is due to the fact that the margins remained almost con-
stant while the prices decreased. At the end of the period margins differed across network
operators with E-plus having the lowest value of about 28%, T-Mobile roughly 31% and
D2 approximately 36%.
This paper employs the standard aggregate nested logit model and the results therefore
depend on the limitations of the empirical model. For instance, the nested logit model has
the property of independence of irrelevant alternatives within the nest, which implies that
all cross-price elasticities with respect to the price of certain product are the same. Also
cross-price elasticities of demand within the nest denoted by Esjtpkt and the elasticity of
demand for mobile services in total given by Estpkt depend on market shares sjt and therefore
are the smallest for E-Plus. Unfortunately, given data limitations we cannot use a more
flexible framework, such as the random coefficients model. Also, we cannot estimate
own and cross-price elasticities using a system of linear demands (having three prices in
each equation) because of high price collinearity. Any restriction on price coefficients in
linear demand system would also impose restrictions on elasticities.
7. Conclusion
In this paper we analyze the role of network effects in the mobile telecommunications
industry in Germany. We find that network effects have a significant impact on consum-
ers’ decisions regarding subscriptions to mobile services. We are able to disentangle the
impact of price and network effects on subscription demand and estimate reasonable price
ARTICLE IN PRES Selasticities. For instance, on average in the period January 1998–June 2003, a 1% price
increase by T-Mobile resulted in 4.48% decrease in its sales and in 2.22% increase in
the sales by D2 and E-Plus. Furthermore, a 1% price increase by T-Mobile resulted in
0.52% decrease in total sales of mobiles, which is the outcome of two opposite effects –
a decrease in sales by T-Mobile and an increase in sales by the other network operators.
Similarly, a 1% price increase by D2 and E-Plus led to a decrease in total sales by 0.52%
and 0.19%, respectively. If the previous period total installed base increased by 1%, cur-
rent period sales would surge on average by 0.69%. If there were no network effects, the
penetration of mobiles at the end of the period analyzed could be at least 50% lower. Cur-
rent penetration levels could be reached only if prices were drastically lower. Furthermore,
by estimating the price coefficient and assuming Nash equilibrium in prices we could pro-
vide measurements of marginal costs.
Besides the limitations mentioned in the former section, the discrete-choice model fits
well to the analysis of mobile telephony where each consumer subscribes exactly to one
network. The other advantage of nested logit model is that it leads to linear demand func-
tions and could be easily applied for antitrust analysis. In the presence of constraints on
data and timing of the analysis, which is almost always the case, an application of stan-
dard empirical framework is unavoidable.
As suggested by this study, network effects are an important aspect of antitrust analysis
in mobile telephony. They influence consumers’ subscription decisions to mobile services.
By ignoring network effects, that is, by attributing the whole dramatic changes in demand
to decreases in prices, we could overestimate price elasticities and underestimate margins.
Thus, we could end up drawing incorrect conclusions about the competitiveness of the
industry.Acknowledgements
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